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Abstract:
This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin
(1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in
games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payo¤ func-
tions. The conditions can be applied widely, and examples for existence
of pure strategy and monotonic equilibria in First-Price auctions are
provided. The conditions are also appropriate for ensuring that com-
puter generated equilibrium solutions can be extended to continuous
strategy spaces.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Discontinuous Payo¤ Function, First-
Price Auctions.
JEL Classi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A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Discontinuous Payo¤s
J. Rupert J. Gatti1
The seminal paper on the existence of Nash equilibria in games with
discontinuous payo¤ functions is Dasgupta & Maskin (1986). In that
paper Dasgupta & Maskin weaken the assumption of continuous payo¤
functions made in the classical existence theorems (e.g. Debreu (1952))
and generate existence results for mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in
a family of games possessing a very specic form of discontinuity in
their payo¤s. Simon (1987) and Reny (1999) generalize their results
to a broader set of games, while Reny allows for the analysis of pure
strategy, as well as mixed strategy, Nash equilibria. This paper strictly
generalizes the results of Dasgupta & Maskin and Simon, but in a
di¤erent way to Reny, allowing existence of pure and mixed strategy
Nash Equilibrium to be proven in classes of games not considered by
Reny. The usefulness of this result is demonstrated with an application
to First-Price auctions which itself extends existence theorems provided
by Maskin & Riley (2000), Athey (2001), Jackson et al. (2001) and
Reny & Zamir (2004).
The general approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) to
the problem of determining conditions for the existence of a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium in games with compact strategy spaces and
discontinuous payo¤s is to consider a sequence of consecutively ner
nite approximations of the strategy space, converging to the compact
space at the limit. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist for games
with nite strategy spaces (Nash 1951), so conditions are derived which
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ensure that the limit of a sequence of nite gameNash equilibria is
itself a Nash equilibrium of the limit game. As the limit of any sequence
of nite gameNash equilibria will be non-empty, and there exist games
without Nash equilibria (Sion & Wolfe (1957)), it must be the case that
additional restrictions on the game are required.
Dasgupta & Maskin consider games where the points of disconti-
nuities in each players payo¤ function can be represented by a nite
number of continuous and one-to-one functions of the strategies of other
players. The main result of their paper (1986a, Theorem 5, p.14) iden-
ties additional conditions on the agentspayo¤ functions which ensure
that the limit of any sequence of nite gameNash equilibria is a Nash
equilibrium of the limit game.
Simon explains that these conditions are stronger than is necessary.
If a particular sequence of nite approximations of the strategy space
is referred to as a nite test sequence, then for any nite test sequence
we may consider a limit setof mixed strategies which are the limit of
a sequence of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria in games along the test
sequence. The conditions identied by Dasgupta & Maskin e¤ectively
ensure that every element of every limit set for every nite test sequence
is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game. Simon (1987, Lemma, p.575)
derives conditions which ensure that every element of the limit set
for a particular nite test sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the limit
game. He then goes on to identify conditions on the payo¤ functions
of agents which are su¢ cient to satisfy the conditions in his lemma .
The increased generality of these results is that the conditions need not
hold true for every test sequence, but only for one.
Reny (1999) takes a di¤erent approach to that of Dasgupta &Maskin
and Simon, considering a sequence of approximations of the payo¤
function rather than of the strategy space. He obtains conditions for
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the limit game if Nash exist for
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each approximation game, and shows that these conditions are strictly
more general than those obtained by Simon. Moreover Renys results
are applicable to pure as well as mixed strategy games.
However, even conceptually, it is clear that Simons conditions are
stronger than required for existence. Considering just one nite test
sequence, it is not necessary that every element of the limit set be a
Nash equilibrium of the limit game but just that there exists an element
where this is true. Furthermore we need not restrict the test sequence
to include only nite strategy spaces. The main result in this paper
(Theorem 1) provides su¢ cient conditions for an element of a limit set
to be a Nash equilibrium of the limit game, and does not restrict the
test sequence to be nite. Furthermore it is shown that an acceptable
test sequence satisfying the conditions exists for any Nash equilibrium
of the limit game.
The characteristic feature of Theorem 1 is that it requires the
identication of a specic test sequence and a specic element of
the limit set. Thus, for example, it is particularly applicable for
testing the generality of equilibria obtained by computer simulation
(with necessarily nite strategy spaces) to games with continuous
strategy spaces. For theoretical work however, where conditions on the
primitives of the model are probably more applicable, this requirement
may appear overly restrictive. However Theorem 1 can be applied
in tandem with any primitives based existence theorem to extend the
existence result to a wider class of games. Theorem 1, in combination
with any condition su¢ cient for the creation of an acceptable test
sequence, will ensure the existence of equilibria in the limit game
and existence results generated using alternative approaches, see for
example Baye et al (1993) and Tian (1992), can be applied if desired.
This feature is highlighted in the application.
In the following section the primary notation and denitions are
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introduced and the main result of the paper stated. An application of
this result to First-Price auctions is provided in Section 2, while Section
3 concludes.
1 The Existence Result.
Consider a game G = (S; U), where S =Xi2ISi , I is the nite set of
all agents, Si is a compact metric space of strategies for agent i 2 I
, U =Xi2IUi and Ui : S ! R is the utility function for agent i. I
assume that the utility function is bounded and Borel measurable. Let
N(G) denote the set of (pure strategy) Nash Equilibria of the game G,
we are interested in obtaining conditions that will ensure that N(G) is
non-empty. To do this we consider a sequence of games all possessing
Nash equilibria and converging to the game G.
Let F (Si) be the set of closed, non-empty subsets of Si and F (S) =
Xi2IF (Si). Paired with the Hausdor¤ metric, dH , F (S) is a compact
metric space (Hildenbrand 1974, p17).2
Dene a Test Sequence for S;  : N! F (S); to be a mapping from
the Natural numbers into F (S); so (n)  S; and limn !1 dH((n); S) =
0:We may consider a test sequence for S as a sequence of progressively
ner approximations of S, converging to the compact metric space S
in the limit, but notice that the test sequence need not be nite. A
test sequence, combined with the utility function U , can be used to
generate a sequence of games Gn = ((n); U) which converges to the
limit game G; and a corresponding sequence Nn 2 F ((n)) [? where
Nn = N(Gn) is the set of all (pure strategy) Nash Equilibria of the
2"For every two non-empty subsets E and F of the metric space (X; d) one denes
the Hausdor¤ distance dH(E;F ) (with respect to the metric d on X ) by
dH(E;F ) = inff" 2 (0;1)jE  B"(F ) and F  B"(E)g;
where B"(E) denotes the "-neighbourhood of E." (Hildenbrand, p.16)
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Game Gn:
Assigning the topology of weak convergence, every (non-empty)
sequence in compact metric space S possesses a convergent sub-
sequence (Hidenbrand, p49). Without loss of generality we consider
only convergent sub-sequences, and will call a test sequence  acceptable
when, for all n, Nn is non-empty and limn !1Nn = N 2 F (S): The
existence of such a sequence is not guaranteed, but Theorem 1 identies
conditions which ensure that there exists an element s 2 N such that
s 2 N(G) when an acceptable sequence has been identied. In fact
Theorem 1 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of Nash equilibrium, thus we also know that for any Nash equilibrium of
the limit game there exists at least one acceptable sequence satisfying
the conditions.
Before stating Theorem 1 two further denitions are required, both
of which are direct extensions of concepts developed by Simon and Reny.
Consider a test sequence  and a convergent sequence of strategies
(sn)n2N where sn 2 (n); limn!1 sn = s 2 S and limn!1 Ui(sn) is
dened for all agents i 2 I.3
Denition 1 We will say that the utility function U has the comple-
mentary discontinuity property (cdp) for the sequence (sn)n2N
if, for any agent i 2 I where limn!1 Ui(sn) > Ui(s) there exists an-
other agent j 2 I where limn!1 Uj(sn) < Ui(s).
The complementary discontinuity property ensures that, if an agents
expected payo¤ decreases discontinuously along the sequence (sn)n2N
at s then there exists another agent who experiences a discontinuous
increase in utility. Notice that, in contrast to Simon and Reny, this
property does NOT need to hold for every sequence - but is dened for
3As S is compact and Ui is bounded every test sequence will posses a sub-sequence
with these properties, without loss of generality we consider only these sub-sequences.
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the specic sequence (sn)n2N:4
Let Zni :  i(n) ! R be the best response value function for agent
i , where Zni (s
n
 i) = maxsni 2 i(n) Ui(s
n
i ; s
n
 i) and similarly let Zi(s i) =
maxsi2Si Ui(si; s i): The best response value function represents the
highest level of utility agent i can obtain in the game Gn given the
strategies played by all other agents. Clearly, from the denition
of Nash Equilibrium, sn 2 Nn if and only if, for all agents i 2 I;
Ui(s
n) = Zni (s
n
 i):
Denition 2 We will say that the Utility function is payo¤ secure
(ps) for the sequence (sn)n2N if, for all agents i 2 I and all  > 0
there exists n <1 such that for all n  n; Zni (sn i) > Zi(s i)  :
Payo¤security ensures that, along the sequence (sn)n2N, every agent
can obtain a payo¤ against opponents strategies su¢ ciently close to
s i which is almost as good as the best payo¤ obtainable by the agent
in the limit game against s i: Once again, the generalization of this
condition over similar conditions dened by Simon and Reny is that
payo¤ security is dened for a specic sequence and need not hold for
all possible sequences. Having introduced this terminology, the main
existence theorem can now be stated.
Theorem 1 Existence Theorem.
A vector of strategies s 2 S will constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
game G = (S; U) if and only if there exists an acceptable test sequence
 and a sequence of strategies (sn)n2N , where snNn and limn!1
sn = s , such that the utility function U
a. possesses the complementary discontinuity property for the
sequence (sn)n2N and
4Using slightly di¤erent terminology to Simon, Reny refers to this property as
reciprocal upper semicontinuity rather than complementary discontinuity.
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b. is payo¤ secure for the sequence (sn)n2N:
Proof. a. Su¢ ciency
The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that s =2 N(G), so there exists an agent i 2 I , i > 0 and
ti 2 Si such that Ui(ti; s i) > Ui(s) + i:
As the sequence is acceptable and U is payo¤ secure along the
sequence we have that
lim
n!1Ui(s
n) = lim
n!1Z
n
i (s
n
 i)
> Zi(s

 i)  i
 Ui(ti; s i)  i
> Ui(s
)
As U possess the complementary discontinuity property along the
sequence, there exists another agent j 2 I and j > 0 such that
lim
n!1Uj(s
n) < Uj(s
)  j:
Payo¤ security ensures that there exists n < 1 such that for all
n  n there exists tnj 2 Sni where
Uj(t
n
j ; s
n
 j) > Uj(s
)  j
2
> lim
n!1Uj(s
n) +
j
2
Thus, for n su¢ ciently high, Znj (s
n
 j)  Uj(tnj ; sn j) > Uj(sn) and
sn =2 Nn, a contradiction.
b. Necessity
The proof is by construction, we show that for any s 2 N(G) it
is possible to construct a (nite) acceptable sequence, along which the
conditions hold.
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Specically we make use of the fact that if s 2 S 0  S and
s 2 N(G) then s 2 N(G0) where G0 = (S 0; U): Consider the nite
strategy space where for all i 2 I; S1i = fsi g: Along any sequence 
such that S1i  Sni  Sn+1i such that limn!1 dH(Sn; S) = 0 have
that s 2 N(Gn) and Zni (s i) = Ui(s) along the sequence. Thus the
complementary discontinuity property and payo¤ security are trivially
satised along any such sequence sequence.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
The characteristic di¤erence between Theorem 1 and other existence
results (e.g. Reny (1999), Athey (2001)) is that Theorem 1 relies
on the identication of a specic sequence of approximation games
and Nash equilibria, rather than being on the primitives of the game
itself. Thus it can be easily applied to equilibria generated by computer
approximation to ensure they remain equilibria in continuous strategy
spaces. As Athey (2001) notes, computer simulations are becoming an
increasingly powerful tool for solving games with discontinuous payo¤s.
The result is also applicable in specic games where more restrictive
general properties over the primitives of the game fail. Examples
of the former can be easily constructed - being any game where (for
example) the misbehaviourof the payo¤s can be shown to occur at an
irrelevant part of the payo¤ function.
However Theorem 1 can also be applied in less specic settings to
provide existence results which are based on the primitives of the game.
For example, Corollary 1 provides general conditions on the payo¤
function which ensure existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in the game G = (S; U) whenever a acceptable test sequence can be
established.
Following Reny (1999), for all s 2 S let U(s) = (U1(s); : : : UI(s)):
The graph of the vector payo¤ function is the subset of SxRI given by
f(s; u) 2 SxRI j u = U(s)g: We will say that:
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a. player i can secure a payo¤  2 R at s 2 S if there exists an
s 2 Si such that Ui(s; s0 i)   for all s0 i in some open neighbourhood
of s i
b. U is payo¤ secure everywhere if for every s 2 S and " > 0 each
player i can secure a payo¤ Ui(s)  " at s.
c. U possesses the complementary discontinuity property everywhere
if, whenever (s; u) is in the closure of the graph of its vector payo¤
function and Ui(s)  ui for every player i, then Ui(s) = ui for every
player i.
Corollary 2 If the utility function possesses the complementary dis-
continuity property everywhere and is payo¤ secure everywhere then a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists whenever an acceptable test se-
quence exists.
Proof. If the utility function is cdp and ps everywhere then it is
cdp and ps for any acceptable test sequence. Thus the result follows
directly from Theorem 1. QED.
Reny (1999, Theorem 3.1) provides an existence theorem with similar
features. The di¤erence between Corollary 1 and Renys result is that
this Corollary requires only the existence of an acceptable test sequence
(a weaker condition than quasi concavity of the game) while Reny
requires better-reply security (a weaker condition than cdp and ps).
Extending Theorem 1 and Corrolary 1 to allow for mixed strategy
equilibrium is straight forward, requiring only the extension of deni-
tions to the new setting. Of course the advantage of considering mixed
strategies in this setting is that, applying Nashs theorem, every game
with nite strategy spaces possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Thus any test sequence  , where (n) is nite for all n possesses an
acceptable subsequence in mixed strategies.
Let (M(S);	) denote the mixed strategy extension of the limit game
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G = (S; U), and (M((n));	) denote the mixed strategy extension of
Gn = ((n); U); where
M(X) =Xi2IM(Xi) and M(Xi) is the set of probability
measures dened on the Borel subsets of Xi, and
	() =Xi2I	i() where 	i : M(S) ! R such that 	i() =R
Ui(s)d:
For every mixed strategy (n) 2 M((n)) there exists an obvious
extension n 2 M(S); thus the any sequence of strategies ((n))n2N
can be written as a sequence (n)n2N . As, by assumption, S is compact
and U is bounded and Borel measurable, the set M(S) paired with the
Prohorov metric,, is a compact metric space and 	i is bounded.
It follows directly that Theorem 1 can be applied to the mixed strat-
egy specication (M(S);	) where the denitions of the complemen-
tary discontinuity property and payo¤ security are applied to the new
mixedstrategy spaceM(S) and expectedutility function 	: In prac-
tice some care is required in making the transition to the new speci-
cations. Simon shows that even if the complementary discontinuity
holds universally for the game (S; U) it may fail in the mixed strategy
extension (M(S);	) (Simon, footnote 7, p596). Similarly, the proof of
the necessity condition also requires careful interpretation - as it is now
the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies which must be available
along test sequence.
Reny (Corollary 5.2) shows that any game where the expected utility
function possesses the complementary and discontinuity property gen-
erally possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and demonstrates
that this result generalizes previous mixed strategy equilibrium results
of Nash (1950), Glicksberg (1952), Mas-Colell (1984), Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986), Robson (1994) and Simon (1987). Corollary 2 provides
an alternative proof for this result.
Corollary 3 (Reny Corollary 5.2) The game (S; U) possesses a mixed
10
strategy Nash equilibrium if the expected utility function 	 possesses
the complementary discontinuity property and is payo¤ secure for all
sequences (n)n2N:
Proof. As every nite test sequence is acceptable and generates
a convergent sequence of Nash strategies, and the expected utility
function possess the c.d. property and is payo¤ secure along every
sequence, Theorem 1 must be satised. QED.
In the following section we further demonstrate the power of
Theorem 1 by developing existence results for pure strategy and
monotone equilibria in First-Price Auctions.
2 Application: High Bid Auctions
There are numerous examples of First Price or High Bid auctions which
possess pure strategy Nash equilibria when the strategy is space is nite
but where existence of a Nash equilibrium fails for continuous strategy
spaces.5 The failure of existence with continuous strategy spaces is
due to the possibility of ties, at winning bids, between bidders who
value winning the auction di¤erently. Jackson et al. (2001) show that
there always exists a tie breaking rule which will support equilibrium
in the continuous strategy game, and that this tie-breaking rule can be
implemented with the addition of a cheap talkphase to the auction
game. However, two major caveats are identied for the generality and
applicability of these results. First, they are considering equilibrium
solutions in mixed strategies rather than pure strategies. Second, the
tie-breaking rule in equilibriumwill generally depend on the distribution
of types of the bidders involved - information a real auctioneer is unlikely
to possess. Thus, they note that
5Athey (2001), Jackson et al. (2001), Maskin & Riley (2000), Reny & Zamir (2003).
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"It seems an important challenge to identify circumstances in which
uniform action rules - not depending on such information - su¢ ce to
guarantee existence of equilibrium." (Jackson et al. 2001, footnote 4,
p4)
Maskin & Riley (2000) address this problem directly and propose
a two stage auction where, in the rst stage, bidders participate in a
standard High Bidauction. If, however, two or more players submit
the same highest bid then the tie is broken by a second round Vickery
auction amongst only the high bid players. Maskin & Riley proceed
to identify conditions which ensure that a monotonic pure strategy
equilibrium exists for the two stage auction with continuous strategies
(Proposition 2, p.444). As they demonstrate with an example (Example
3, p.444), these conditions are more restrictive than required for the
existence of a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium in the case of nite
strategy spaces.
In this section we propose an alternative second round tie breaking
auction, specically a cheap-talk high bid auction where bidders
submit costless messages drawn from an ordered and nite message
space. We show that, when the set of bidders and types are nite,
this second round auction will support a pure strategy equilibrium
under any conditions su¢ cient for equilibrium in nite strategy spaces
(in fact the main result is more general than this). Furthermore
equilibrium properties such as monotonicity that exist in the nite
auctions will survive in the continuous strategy equilibrium. Thus for
nite type spaces this result is a direct generalisation of Maskin &
Riley and, for example, allows us to directly extend any existence and
monotonicity results generated in nite strategy spaces to continuous
strategy spaces.6
To prove these assertions requires the introduction of further nota-
6Extending the results to continuous type space is objective of present research.
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tion. Consider a standardnite type high bid auction, A = (B;ui;Ti)i2I ,
where :
i. There is a nite set (I) of potential bidders for a single, indivisible,
product.
ii. Each player i 2 I has a type ti 2 Ti, where Ti is a nite set, which
is known to the player but unobserved other players.7 Let f(t1; :::; tI)
denote the probability of (t1; :::; tI) 2 Xi2ITi; and dene the conditional
probability
gi(tijt i) = f (ti; t i)P
t0 i
f(ti; t
0
 i)
Assume further that, for all i 2 I and all ti 2 Ti, there exists
t0 i 2 T i such that f(ti; t0 i) > 0; ensuring that gi(tijt i) is always
well dened.
iii. Each player selects whether or not to participate in the auction,
a bid bi 2 B = [b; b]  R and receives a payo¤ ui(bi; ti; t i) if awarded
the product auctioned, and zero otherwise.8,9 Assume further that all
payo¤ functions are bounded and are continuous and non-increasing
with respect to the players bid, bi:
iv. A strategy for each agent consists of a vector of type dependent
bids which can be written si = (bi(t))t2Ti 2 Xt2TiB = Si; where Si is a
compact metric space.
The standard high bid auction awards the product to the partici-
pating bidder submitting the highest bid, or randomly amongst those
7Standard abuse of notation allows us to write i 2 I = f1; :::; Ig: For notational
ease we restrict the set of types, T , and the space of bids,B, to be the same for all
bidders - but the results can easily be extended to allow the type and strategy spaces
to be type dependent.
8Following standard notation, let x i denote the vector x without the ith
component.
9The bounds on the set of bids could be justied by assuming either that the
buyer and seller are wealth constrained, or by assuming that there exists a minimum
(reservation) bid the seller will accept and a bid so high as to guarantee negative
utility if successful. For simplicity we assume that the nonparticipation decision is
represented by the bid bi = ?; and that the product auctioned will only ever be
assigned to a participating bidder.
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bidders submitting the highest bid if more than one does so. Notice that
the payo¤ functions from winning remain quite general, and may di¤er
between bidders. It is NOT necessary that all winning bidders pay
their bid in full - thus this general specication allows the auctioneer
to favourone player over another when awarding the commodity.
We wish to augment the standard high-bid auction by introducing a
second round cheap talkhigh bid auction. Specically we introduce a
nite and ordered message space,  = f0; :::;Mg: Bidders who tie for
the highest bid in the rst round submit a costless message, i 2 ;
and the auction winner is then selected randomly from amongst those
who have submitted the highest message. We denote this cheap talk
message augmented auction by bA = ((B;);ui;Ti)i2I ; and the set of
Nash equilibrium in this auction N( bA): As before, we will consider a
sequence of approximations of the bid space Bn converging to B; so
limn!1 dH(Bn; B) = 0; and the corresponding sequence of auctions
An = ((Bn;ui;Ti)i2I .
The main result is now stated in Theorem 2, with the proof contained
in the Appendix.
Theorem 4 For any acceptable sequence of high-bid auctions An =
((Bn;ui;Ti)i2I converging to A = (B;ui;Ti)i2I ; any s 2 N =
limn!1N(An); and any cheap talkmessage augmented auction bA =
((B;);ui;Ti)i2I where # = M + 1 > T = i2I Ti;
there exist an equilibrium bs 2 N( bA) such that s and bs assign the
same rst roundbid to all players. That is, for any i 2 I and ti 2 Ti;
if si (ti) = b 2 B then bsi (ti) = (b; i(ti)).
Furthermore, if there exists a sequence sn 2 N(An) such that
limn!1 sn = s and sn is (strictly) monotonic for all n su¢ ciently
large, then so to is the equilibrium bs 2 N( bA):
Once again, the application of Theorem 2 requires the existence of
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an acceptable test sequence to be demonstrated. The Theorem can be
interpreted as saying that for any auction with nite types where an
acceptable sequence can be shown to exist, imposing a cheap talkhigh
bid message auction as the tie breaking rule will ensure an equilibrium
exists in the continuous auction. Notice that the theorem does not
require, but certainly allows, the test sequence to be nite. Maskin &
Riley (2000), for example, present three examples of rst price auctions
where Nash equilibria are shown to exist for any nite space of bids, but
fail to exist when continuous bids are allowed. It follows directly from
Theorem 2 that all three will necessarily have equilibria when the cheap
talk high bid message tie breaking rule is imposed - which they show is
not the case for the Vickery auction tie breaking rule they proposed.10
3 Conclusion.
In this paper we develop necessary su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium in games with discontin-
uous payo¤s and continuous strategy spaces. The approach is a direct
generalization of the existence results developed by Dasgupta & Maskin
(1986) and Simon (1989), and the conditions identied di¤er from the
su¢ cient conditions developed by Reny (1999). These di¤erences are
explained, and the result used to provide alternative proofs to some
general existence results rst presented by Reny. The main theorem
(Theorem 1) identies properties for the limit of a sequence of solu-
tions to approximating games to be an equilibrium in the limit game.
The properties identied are reasonably transparent and are particu-
larly appropriate for testing computer generated solutions to specic
games, where nite approximations of continuous strategy spaces are a
technical necessity. In an application the main theorem is applied to
10Specically, their Example 3 (p.444) does not possess an equilibrium with the
Vickery tie-breaking rule.
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First-Price Auctions, where a specic cheap talktie breaking rule is
proposed - with ties in the highest bid being broken by a second round,
costless, High-Bid message auction. It is shown that implementing this
tie breaking rule will ensure existence and (strict) monotonicity of Nash
equilibria in continuous First-Price auctions whenever these properties
exist in nite First-Price auctions.
16
References
[1] Athey, S. (2001) Single crossing properties and the existence
of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information.
Econometrica, 69, 861-889.
[2] Baye, M.R., Tian, G. and Zhou, J. (1993) Characterizations of
the existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous and non-
quasiconcave payo¤s.Review of Economic Studies, 60, 935-948.
[3] Billingsley, P. (1968) Convergence of Probability Measures. Wiley.
[4] Billingsley, P. (1986) Probability and Measure (2nd ed.). Wiley.
[5] Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. (1986a) The existence of equilibrium
in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory.Review of Economic
Studies, 53, 1-27.
[6] Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. (1986b) The existence of equilibrium
in discontinuous economic games, II: Applications. Review of
Economic Studies, 53, 27-42
[7] Debreu, G. (1952) A social equilibrium existence theorem.Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 38, 886-893.
[8] Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (1986) Limit games and limit
equilibria.Journal of Economic Theory, 38, 261-279.
[9] Gatti, J.R.J. (1996) Multi-commodity search: Three essays. Ph.D.
Thesis, University of Cambridge.
[10] Hildenbrand, W. (1974) Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy.
Princeton University Press.
[11] Jackson, M.O., Simon, L.K., Swinkels, J.M., and Zame, W.R.
(2001) Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of
incomplete information.Mimeo.
17
[12] Nash, J. (1951) Non-cooperative games., Annals of Mathematics,
54, 266-295.
[13] Reny, P.J. (2001) On the existence of pure and mixed strategy
Nash equilibria in discontinuous games.Econometrica, 67, 1029-
1056.
[14] Reny, P.J. and Zamir, S. (2004) On the existence of pure
strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric rst-price auctions.
Econometrica, 72, 1105-1125.
[15] Simon, L.K. (1987) Games with discontinuous payo¤s.Review of
Economic Studies , 54, 569-97.
[16] Simon, L.K. and Zame, W.R. (1990) Discontinuous games and
endogenous sharing rules.Econometrica, 58, 861-872.
[17] Sion, M. and Wolfe, P. (1957) On a game without a value.
Contributions to the Theory of Games, III. Annals of Mathematical
Studies, 39, 299-306.
[18] Tian, G. (1992) Existence of equilibrium in abstract economies
with discontinuous payo¤s and non-compact choice spaces.Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 21, 379-388.
18
4 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.
By denition, for every s 2 N = limn!1N(An) there exists a
convergent subsequence sn 2 N(An) such that limn!1 sn = s: The
proof proceeds by showing that for every such subsequence sn it is
possible to construct a sequence of (costly) message augmented auctions
(cAn) which converges to the costless message augmented auction bA;
and an associated sequence of Nash equilibria bsn 2 N(cAn) such that
limn!1 bsn = bs 2 N( bA) and that the Nash equilibria bs and s are
related in the manner described in the Theorem.
We show (Lemma 3) that for any sequence sn 2 N(An) there exists
a sequence of nite high price auctions An such that sn 2 N(An) and
limn!1 dH(An; A) = 0: We obtain conditions (Lemma 1) that enable
a nite high bid auction to be represented by a strategically equivalent
nite message-augmented auction. We then (Lemma 2) apply Theorem
1 to identify conditions which ensure that the limit of a sequence of
equilibria of the nite message-augmented auctions is an equilibrium of
the limiting message-augmented auction. We then show by construction
(Lemma 3) that the limit of any sequence of Nash equilibria in high
bid auctions can also be obtained as the rst round bid component of
the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria in nite message-augmented
auctions that satisfy the conditions identied in Lemma 2. Thus, as
required, the limit of this sequence constitutes an equilibrium of the
continuous-bid message augmented auction. Finally, we show that
messages are costless in the limiting auction, and that the monotonicity
property survives in the limit.
Some initial notation is required.
Let X be a nite and ordered set. Without loss of generality, let
X = fx1; x2; :::; x#Xg where x1 < x2 < ::: < x#X :
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For any x 2 X let R(x;X) : X ! N denote the relative ranking of
x within X and let R 1(i;X) : N ! X be the inverse mapping. Thus
R(xi;X) = i and R 1(i;X) = xi:
Dene a mapping  : X  Z+ ! X such that for any x 2 X
and any non-negative integer z 2 Z+; (x; z) = fy 2 XjR(y;X) =
minfR(x;X) + z;#Xg: Thus (x; z) gives the element of X which is
ranked z higher than x or, if no such element exists, the largest element
in the set X:
Lemma 5 A nite rst price auction An = ((Bn;ui;Ti)i2I can be
represented by a strategically equivalent nite message-augmentedhigh
bid auction cAn = ((cBn;); vi;Ti)i2I ; where  = f0; 1; :::;Mg and
vi((b; ); ti; t i) = ui( (b; ) ; ti; t i); if there exists cBn  Bn such that
the mapping  : cBn ! Bn is one-to-one and onto.
Furthermore, if auctions An and cAn are strategically equivalent, then
for any sn 2 N (An) there exists bsn 2 N cAn if and only if for all i 2 I
and ti 2 Ti, sni (ti) = 
 bsni (ti) :
Proof:
If the mapping  : cBn! Bn is 1-1 and onto then the two spaces
map into each other uniquely and, given the utility function, the two
auctions are identical providing they determine the winner identically.
This requires that for all ; 0 2 ; (x; ) < (y; 0) if x < y, and that
(x; ) < (x; 0) if and only if  < 0: These properties follow directly
from the requirement that  : cBn ! Bn is 1-1 and onto - and so
(x;M) < (y; 1) if and only if x < y:QED:
It may be worth noting that, as dened, the messages are not
costless when the bid space is nite. However, as the distance between
consecutive bids converges to zero, so too does the cost of any message.
As in Theorem 1, we now consider a sequence of nite bid spaces (Bn)
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converging to the continuous bid space (B); so limn!1Bn = B; and
the corresponding sequence of nite-bid message augmented auctionscAn = ((cBn;); vi;Ti)i2I converging to the continuous bid message
augmented auction bA = ((B;); vi;Ti)i2I : We will call this sequence
of auctions acceptable if, for all n, there exists a Nash equilibriumbsn 2 N(cAn):Without loss of generality we can consider only convergent
subsequences, for which limn!1 bsn = bs:
Lemma 6 If, for the message augmented auction bA, there exists
an acceptable sequence of nite message augmented auctions and a
sequence of strategies
  bsn
n2N where for all n; bsn 2 N(cAn), and
limn!1 bsn = bs = (bi (ti); i (ti))i2I , such that
a. for all i 2 I; ti 2 Ti , i (ti) < M; and
b. if there exists i; j 2 I such that bi (ti) = bj(tj) then bni (ti) = bnj (tj)
for all n
then bs 2 N( bA):
Proof:
The proof is a direct application of Theorem 1. First we show that
the conditions identied ensure that the payo¤ function possesses the
complementary discontinuity property along the sequence, and then
that the payo¤ function is also payo¤ secure along the sequence.
A players expected payo¤ in the auction can be written as
Vi((b; ); cs ijti) =X
l0
0@ X
t i2P li ((b;);ds i)

1
l + 1

vi((b; ); ti; t i)f(t i j ti)
1A (EqnA)
where
P li ((b; ); cs i) = ft i 2 T ijfor all j 6= i; (bj(tj); j(tj))  (b; )
and
#fj 2 Inij(bj(tj); j(tj)) = (b; )g = lg
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denotes the subset of types where, given the strategies played by other
players (s i); player i making bid b with message  will tie for the
highest bid with l other players.
a. Complementary Discontinuity.
We show that, along the sequence, the payo¤ function for all players
is continuous, and so the complementary discontinuity property is
satised trivially.
By assumption, vi((b; ); ti; t i) = ui((b; ); ti; t i) is continuous in
its rst term, so Eqn A shows that any discontinuity in Vi((b; ); cs i j ti)
is due to a discontinuity in one or more of the partitions of the type
space P li (b; cs i): More formally, along the sequence   bsnn2N ;
limn!1 Vi((bni (ti); 
n
i (ti));
csn ijti) = Vi((bi (ti); i (ti)); cs ijti)
if for all l  0; limn!1 P li ((bni (ti); ni (ti)); csn i) = P li ((bi (ti); i (ti)); cs i).
As P li ((b
n
i (ti); 
n
i (ti));
csn i) is a subset of a nite space the limit
of this sequence is well dened and there exists a subsequence such
that P li ((b
n
i (ti); 
n
i (ti));
csn i) = P  T i for all n: Discontinuity of this
sequence in the limit requires that P li ((b

i (ti); 

i (ti));
cs i) 6= P .
As the message space is nite we know that there exists a subse-
quence such that, for all i 2 I and ti 2 Ti , ni (ti) = i (ti): Condition
(b) ensures that bi (ti) = b

j(tj) if and only if b
n
i (ti) = b
n
j (tj) for all n:
Thus t i 2 P li ((bni (ti); ni (ti)); csn i) = P li ((bni (ti); i (ti)); csn i) if and only
if t i 2 P li ((bi (ti); i (ti)); cs i); and so P li ((bi (ti); i (ti)); cs i) = P as
required.
b. Payo¤ security.
Let Zti(cs i) = max(b;)2B Vi((b; ); cs ijti) denote the best re-
sponse value function for agent i of type ti;
and let Znti(
csn i) = max(bn;)2Bn Vi((bn; ); csn ijti): We show that
the conditions in Lemma 2 ensure that for all i 2 I and ti 2 Ti along
the sequence
  bsn
n2N ; and all  > 0; limn!1 Z
n
ti(
csn i) > Zti(cs i)  :
For any X  B and s i 2 Xtj ;j 6=i(X;); let
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(s i) = fx 2 Xjthere exists j 2 Ini and tj 2 Tj such that
sj(tj) = (x; j(tj))g denote the set of bids that may be realised by
players other than i; given s i:
Suppose that z 2 B and m 2  are best responses for agent i 2 I
of type ti 2 Ti; so Vi((z;m); cs i j ti) = Zti(cs i):We consider separately
the case where z 2 (cs i) and z =2 (cs i):
i) If z 2 (cs i); then there exists a sequence zn 2 (csn i) where
limn!1 zn = z and there exists n <1 such that for all n > n
Znti(
csn i)  Vi((zn;m); csn i j ti) > Vi((z;m); csn i j ti)   2 =
Zti(
cs i)  2 ;
thus limn!1 Znti(csn i) > Zti(cs i)  ; as required.
ii) If z =2 (cs i); then consider the largest observable bid less than
z; specically consider y = fmaxx 2 (cs i) such that x < zg:
By construction no other player of any type is playing a strategy
with a bid in the range (y; z]; and by assumption no player of
any type is playing (y;M): Thus for all b 2 (y; z] ,  2  and
l  0, the subsets P li ((z;m); cs i) = P li ((b; ); cs i) = P li ((y;M); cs i)
and P li ((z;m); cs i) = ? if l > 0: By assumption we have that
vi((b; ); ti; t i) is continuous and non-increasing in b and m thus, from
Eqn. A we have that Vi((y;M); cs i j ti)  Vi((z;m); cs i j ti): As
Vi((z;m); cs i j ti) = Zti(cs i) we have that Vi((y;M); cs i j ti) =
Zti(
cs i) = Vi((z;m); cs i j ti): As y 2 (cs i) we can now apply part
(i) to show that limn!1 Znti(csn i) > Zti(cs i)   ; as required. This
completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 7 For any acceptable sequence of high-bid auctions An =
((Bn;ui;Ti)i2I converging to A = (B;ui;Ti)i2I and any s 2 N =
limn!1N(An); we can construct a sequence of strategically equivalent
message augmented auctions cAn = ((cBn;); vi;Ti)i2I with #fg > T
that converges to bA = ((B;); vi;Ti)i2I and a possesses sequence of
Nash equilibrium strategies
  bsn
n2N converging to bs which satisfy the
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conditions of Lemma 2 (thus bs 2 N( bA)) and where s and bs assign
the same rst roundbid to all players.
Proof:
The proof makes use of the fact that one can systematically remove
unused strategies from players without disrupting Nash equilibrium.
More formally, consider a game G = (S; U) and a Nash equilibrium
s 2 N(G); if s 2 S0  S and G0 = (S0; U) then s 2 N(G0):The proof
proceeds in three steps.
Step 1
Consider the sequence of nite auctions (An)n2N converging to A
and any sequence of Nash equilibrium strategies (sn)n2N converging to
s: For every b 2 (s) there exists a non-empty subset of players whose
equilibrium strategies converge to b, that is for which limn!1 sni (ti) = b:
Consider the set Bn(b) = fx 2 Bnj there exists (i; ti) such that
limn!1 sni (ti) = b and s
n
i (ti) = xg: As the sets of agents and types
are nite there are at most T =
P
i2I Ti elements in Bn(b): Let bn
(resp: bn) denote the min (max) values of Bn(b); and consider the set
Bnb = (B
nn[bn; bn])[Bn(b); which removes all the unusedvalues of Bn
within the range [bn; bn]:
Consider a message space  = f0; 1; :::;Mg and the mapping  :
Bnb ! Bnb . Providing M  T; for all x 2 Bn(b) there exists  < T
such that (b; ) = x, and for all   T have (b; ) > b:
Notice that for any pair of bids b; b0 2 (s); b 6= b0 if and only if
[bn; bn] \ [bn0; bn0] = ? for all n su¢ ciently large: (If not, there exists a
sequence of bids that converges to both b and b0; thus b 6= b0).
We can now repeat this deletion procedure for every b 2 (s); to
obtain
Bn = BnnfSb2(s)[bn; bn]g [ fSb2(s)Bn(b)g:
By denition sn 2 N(An) along the sequence (sn)n2N converging to
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s: By construction sn 2 Bn  Bn and limn!1Bn = B: Thus, for the
high bid auction An = (Bn;ui;Ti)i2I we have that sn 2 N(An) and the
sequence of auctions An is acceptable and converges to A:
Step 2.
Consider now a set cBn  Bn such that
i. R 1(1; cBn) = R 1(1;Bn), so the lowest element of both sets is
the same
ii. for every b 2 (s); bn 2 cBn; so the lowest element of every set of
sequences converging to b is an element
iii. For any x; y 2 cBn such that R(y; cBn) = R(x; cBn) + 1; we
have that M < R(y;Bn)   R(x;Bn) < 2M + 1 and, furthermore,
R(y;Bn)   R(x;Bn) = M + 1 if y 6= bn for some b 2 (s): Thus cBn
takes every (M + 1)th element of Bn; with the proviso that the lowest
element dened in (ii) are elements and no two elements have a rank
di¤erence of less than M + 1 in Bn:
Now, consider the space fBn  Bn dened by the set cBn and the
mapping  : Bn   ! Bn; so that x 2 fBn if and only if there exist
y 2 cBn and  2  such that (y; ) = x. By construction,
for all n; sn 2 fBn thus sn 2 fAn = (fBn;ui;Ti)i2I
dH(fBn; B)  (2M + 1)dH(Bn; B); so the sequence fBn converges to
B; and the sequence fAn converges to A and is acceptable
the mapping  is one to one and onto
Step 3
We can now apply Lemma 1, to show that the sequence of
message augmented auctions cAn = ((cBn;); vi;Ti)i2I are strategically
equivalent to the acceptable sequence of auctions fAn = (fBn;ui;Ti)i2I :
By the construction of cBn; for all b 2 (s) and all (bni (ti); ni (ti))
converging to (b; ) ; bni (ti) =b
n and ni (ti) =  < T M:
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Thus we can apply Lemma 2, to show the limit of the sequence bsn
is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game bA = ((B;); vi;Ti)i2I : This
completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Finally to consider monotonicity we need to dene an ordering (O)
over the space B  M: Specically we shall select the lexicographic
ordering, s.t. (b1;m1) >O (b2;m2) if and only if b1 > b2 or b1 = b2 and
m1 > m2: Clear if the strategies along the sequence sn are (strictly)
monotonic then the corresponding strategies in the message augmented
auctions must also be monotonic and either assign higher bids, or higher
message. As neither bids nor messages converge in the limit - the
limiting strategies must also preserve monotonicity. This completes
the proof of Theorem 2.
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